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The Battle for Minds.
Defeating Toxic Ideologies in the 21st Century
We are in the midst of a generational struggle against an ideology which is an extreme distortion of the Islamic faith, and which holds that mass murder and terror are not only acceptable but necessary. We must tackle this poisonous thinking at home and abroad and resist the ideologues' attempt to divide the world into a clash of civilizations.
-British Prime Minister David Cameron, January 21 2013.
We are losing a battle. It is not the military battles, nor the diplomatic battle, neither is it the economic battle nor, in totality, the informational battle. The outcome of today's war rests in a battle currently hedged in favor of the enemy; a battle to win over the minds of a generation of jihadists, and the generations that may follow them. The initiative in this battle has always rested with al Qaeda and its associates, and has never been fully challenged by the moderate West and likeminded emerging global community. To rehash an old Clausewitizian analogy, it needs to be wrestled back, and put down before the 21 st century's new world order is split once more by David
Cameron's new clash of civilizations. 1 Defeating toxic ideologies requires a multigenerational, multi-national, multi-faceted approach, and an intellectual leap of faith to revisit and re-tailor the traditional strategic levers of power that have been long hailedsomewhat Jominianly -as the principles that guide the application of strategy. The DIME paradigm is not enough to defeat this enemy. 2 For a successful outcome to this war, to finally embattle it in its entirety, education may need to be raised as an equal partner to the existing strategic levers of power.
This paper challenges the current DIME orthodoxy in order to defeat toxic ideologies. It suggests that whilst DIME remains important, education can be, and has been, raised as a strategic lever in its own right to defeat anti (or toxic) ideologies. In 2 these cases DIME has taken an enabling role and should do so again. Stressing that this is can only work over the long-term, it offers a model for success based on establishing Security-Re-education-Education over several generations. Examining al Qaeda's strategy, it confirms that changes of strategic priorities for the United States and Europe may provide an opportunity for a more holistic methodology to finally defeat al Qaeda across every strategic battle-space. It concludes that the United Kingdom is in a prime position due to history, governance, education, and because of its current and future political leadership to take on the development of the strategy to defeat toxic ideologies, such as al Qaeda, and should seize the opportunity now to do so.
This paper is not designed to provide a definitive answer to the of defeat toxic ideologies, but hopes to prompt further analysis on how education could be embraced to win one of the strategic battles in the war against 'Maximalism.' It offers the suggestion that a global institution (based in the United Kingdom) to coordinate, educate and assist nations in developing moderate attitudes and open-mindedness, may be a useful start point for operationalizing a 'new' strategic lever; education.
A Multi-Generational Model
There has been gathering momentum within the rhetoric of British Prime
Ministers that the West now finds itself in a generational struggle. In addition to Prime
Minister David Cameron's recent comments, former Prime Minister Tony Blair recently offered the following magnification.
It is even more clear to me that the battle against militant Islam has to be fought with every means at our disposal, and fought until it is won…When you look at this since 9/11, we in the West want to go in and think there will be a clean result. It's not going to happen like that. We now know that it is going to be long, difficult and messy. You have to take a long-term view and be prepared to engage over that long-term…we are talking about a generation.
The virulent form of Islam in Mali, [with] connections throughout Africa, is trying to destabilize sub-Saharan Africa through terrorist attacks rising out of the same ideology. Because this is driven by a strong ideology with the desire to push out of borders, if we disengage we will see a different set of problems further down the line that are more serious.
If you drive these people into the hills, they will come back. Simultaneously, the United States is pivoting towards the Asia-Pacific to face a resurgent China, nuclear North Korea and a plethora of flash points that threaten global trading norms. The United States is also rapidly moving towards -Americas-basedenergy self-sufficiency, further reducing American reliance on the region. As the United
States switches its main effort, Europe suddenly finds itself in the lead without the full potential of the world's super power to flex its, traditionally well-resourced, DIME muscle on her behalf. Europe is broke, so needs to seek imaginative alternatives, while, as Blair puts it, using every means at its own disposal, no matter how limited these may currently be. Taking a multi-generational approach against toxic ideologies will not only 4 now require Europe's DIME levers to be increasingly strategized into action, but as Tony Blair also points out, we need to educate al Qaeda's target audience for openmindedness and moderation over time.
To achieve this, it is important first to analyze where the priorities for DIME sit across a multi-generational fight and then establish where education can have an impact. Figure 1 outlines where each strategic lever has a major effect over the course of a long campaign. Of course, no two campaigns are identical and timelines may vary, but in the battle to defeat anti-ideologies, 4 historical evidence demonstrates that it can take up to three generations before the toxic ideas can be truly lanced from societies. contributed to the establishment of an Afghan run national education system that includes education for both boys and girls at primary level through to the reestablishment of Kabul University. There is still much to do, but it is a goodinternational -start that has gathered momentum.
Secondly, the Taliban are not an ideology, an idea perhaps, but not a fully proposed reducing Germany to a 'pastoral economy,' by effectively destroying Germany's industrial capacity. 26 The Soviet Union also advocated 'de-industrialization,'
and cognizant of its own emerging ideology followed this with political dismemberment and the removal of the social elite akin to the model used against the Kulaks and Polish officer corps. Probably mindful of the results of the vengeful and vitriolic 1919 Treaty of 16 Versailles, the British hatched another idea. The British approach removed German ideology, not just de-Nazification but also a form of social de-militarization, to eradicate the ideas and principles upon which Germany's authoritarian and military political system were based, replacing them with the ethical, philosophical and political ideas of Britain and her transatlantic descendants. 27 These same ideas also provided the bedrock philosophical and political framework for the United Nations. Using every DIME strategic lever of power available, whilst raising another of equal importance to ensure generational change was maintained (education), Germany was to be re-educated to embrace the rule of law, 'rechtsstaat' not 'real-politik', constitutionalism instead of statism, and philosophical pragmatism instead of Hegelian idealism. 28 By re-educating
Germans that soldiers were paid servants of the community and not the national elite, as well as that individuals legitimized the state and not the other way round, militarism could be eliminated. The British approach therefore did not target the body, but instead targeted the mind.
The primary means of operationalizing this approach involved pulling on the traditional strategic lever of information whilst creating a new strategic lever of power though education. By doing so, the British sought to control and manipulate the media of public opinion formation but also the ideologues, the agencies and individuals that formulated attitudes. Naturally, information concentrated on utilizing the press, cinema and radio, but education ultimately remade Germany. By re-building, re-staffing and redesigning the educational curriculum, part of which concentrated on rewriting national history, the education system secured a multi-generational change in outlook. In addition to resourcing the remaining strategic levers, Germans were taught to model look what a mess we made of it." 31 The point is that while the British have had a long history in tackling ideologies, the United States has traditionally been outstanding at resourcing DIME, but less successful at conceiving bespoke strategies for unique problem sets. This may be due to carrying Jomini in most civil war knapsacks, but it is a historical lesson that appears to have continued with the American-led counter al Qaeda strategy today. It is perhaps why a British lead may provide the answer to defeating today's toxic ideology.
British priorities differed greatly from those of the Americans and Soviets in post war Germany. Placing re-education at the center of its policy, the British played down the physical measures required by the Four D's. Even with regard to de-Nazification, after removing prominent Nazis, the British seem to have been content to empower German minds to take on the long-term task rather than relying on the American and Soviet witch-hunt by military government; a lesson the United States had to relearn during the largely discredited de-Baathification process in Iraq, which is widely regarded by many scholars as having done more harm than good. Being less rigidly tied to an ideology -as is still the case of the United States -the British were also pragmatic when it came to democratization. Unfazed by whether Germany followed the path of popular democracy, indirect constitutional democracy or even a mildly socialist system, the British demonstrated a pragmatic flexibility that continues to this day. All that mattered to the British was that German minds were changed for the long-term and Germany did not start another European war. Unlike the Americans or the Soviets, the British looked to change the administrative basis of the German education system as little as possible.
What mattered was what was taught, not how or necessarily by whom. By doing this the British were able to decentralize the educational process, empower the locals to get on with the task of teaching the right things and allowed the Germans to maintain a degree of cultural autonomy, and most importantly re-establish some pride.
The conception, planning and execution of German re-education started as early as 1918. The British dedicated some of their finest minds to the problem of preventing Germany's warlike culture from resurfacing, which included creative minds such as H.
G. Wells, then director of British propaganda effort towards Germany, and E. H. Carr.
Changing minds was the business of propaganda, but the initial ideas of re-education were hatched by the Political Warfare Executive before finally being implemented via showpiece institutions such as Wilton Park. Born of information, the idea became an exercise that extended into all areas of publication, elite and youth training as well as education, with an almost Orwellian flavor against the "straightforward" DIME measures proposed by others. 32 It was thus an imaginative, bespoke solution to defeating a toxic 20 ideology, and one that demonstrates that with a similar approach today's challenger could succumb to a similar methodology. There is no doubt that re-education was successful in Germany and Japan. As Nicholas Pronay concludes, given that, "neither shows signs of reverting to former habits or ambitions, there appears little doubt that they are as close today to the Anglo-Saxon ideas of a polity as the British planners of re-education could possibly have hoped."
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It is worth considering some of the British methodology that took place to achieve this success. As early as 1943, the British realized that, "re-education of a people comes better from inside the people themselves." It was backed by the notion that, "you cannot force ideas down people's throats." 34 This philosophy was central to early British success, where other allies initially floundered. In Germany, British Education Officers embraced the ideal. Shunning propagandist methods, they regarded themselves as guides, philosophers and friends, selecting German educationists for their ability, whilst begrudgingly relying on the brutal Allied information campaign to serve its purpose of not letting Germans forget. 35 But, coming to terms with the past was a lengthy business.
The key to the success of re-education was therefore rebuilding German pride through personal contact over time. British Educationalists became mentors and facilitators for
German learning, using a system recognizable to anyone who has been through a military staff college. Speakers were used regularly to guide and offer advice to German opposite numbers, seminar-based learning encouraged, and organized trips to Britain used to reinforce the credibility of what they had been offered.
There were also 2.7 million prisoners of war (POWs) outside of Germany. Again, What a fantastic idea it is to attempt to educate a whole race to be peaceful, a race that for centuries has had an instinct for war deep down in its nature. I believe it would be much easier to educate 80 million baboons.
- The idea that people be presented with an opportunity rather than a threat once defeated is critically significant, particularly when addressing the perceived criticism that it will never work unless the target audience has been totally defeated. Cora Goldstein introduces this notion in relation to a perceived failure of American strategy in Afghanistan. 40 She asks why the United States has been unable to accomplish its original objectives in Afghanistan when it was able to radically transform two formidable enemies, Germany and Japan, following World War II? Building on David Edelstein's hypothesis, that military occupations only succeed if they occur in a "threat environment," she contends that the absence of a strong and believable threat leads to a desire for self-determination and the emergence of resistance. 41 Democratization by force (political ideology change) can only have a chance of success in the aftermath of a war that results in the catastrophic defeat of the enemy, "When the war ended with the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers, the Germans and the Japanese were in a state of psychological paralysis and war weariness that made them compliant." 42 Such conditions are, however, not solely required for success.
When changing Germany and Japan, the United States brought the lion's share of resources to bear to support DIME. But in reality, diplomatic, informational, military and economic effort, apart from providing the critical enablers to defeat the respective ideologies, were also the tools by which threat and retribution were executed. The
British system of re-education, far from providing a threat, provided the locals instead with humane opportunity, which they embraced and in the case of the Japanese, fully exploited.
John W. Dower and Masako Shibata back this analogy. As soon as the Japanese surrender had been signed, the Japanese embarked on one of the most impressive 'consent and evade' actions in history against their American conquerors.
Far from Japanese re-education being a product of American policy, as is generally written this time within the victor's history, the Japanese carefully resisted American efforts, largely because once more the United States imposed a, "brutal root-and-branch agenda of demilitarization and democratization that was in every sense a remarkable display of arrogant idealism -both self righteous and genuinely visionary." Despite this resistance, Dower goes on to say, "…the ideals of peace and democracy took root in Japan -not as a borrowed ideology or imposed vision, but as a…seized opportunity." liberal education, and a well-educated military. But, pragmatically, as this paper has attempted to illustrate, it has three Prime Ministers, and potentially a future Prime
Minister, lined up to tackle this issue head on. Their -already quoted -rhetoric appears to strongly back this assumption.
As Britain prepares to take on a leadership role in the G8, and possesses the United Nations Education Envoy in Gordon Brown, it seems well placed now to offer to take the lead in defeating al Qaeda's ideology by building a British-based, but internationally funded, institution that can build upon the historical lessons of Wilton Park and contemporary successes in Saudi Arabia on re-education, democratization and governance to assist nations in developing Minimalism rather than Maximalism.
The world also needs a global institution that can fight the future al Qaeda's by promoting these global values.
Should the international community request that such an institution be 
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Although idealistic (and as likely as ever to be subject to realist ridicule), consideration should be given to the creation of such an institution sooner rather than later. If we wait another generation, we may finally lose the battle for minds against alQaeda, miss the opportunity to have a global institution to defeat the next toxic ideology to emerge in the 21 st Century, or neglect the possibility to assist developing -and developed -nations in resisting anti-ideologies that may proliferate toxicity. If the world wishes to advance global values and norms we need to teach the 'right' things. It is not a new concept. Idealism may be the only way to defeat ideologies.
Teaching wrong things is a crime.
-Kautilya, circa 300 BCE. I have used the term 'anti-ideologies' in this paper to describe ideologies that may still be contrary to the emerging global norms and values, but may not go as far as employing the Maximalist tactics proscribed by toxic ideologies such as al Qaeda. Such ideologies may still need to be challenged early as they often provide the catalyst for the emergence of toxic ideas.
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It is worth noting that in the United Kingdom, and offering advice to Europe, the reeducation and education of potentially radicalized Muslim Diasporas has been managed for several years through the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. See www.counterextremism.org/resources/?theme%5B%5D=19&word= (accessed March 4, 2013). 
